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5

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

DONNA LEE, a Minor, by and
through her Guardian ad Litem,
LOFTIN LEE,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
Case No. 14128

JEANNE W. HOWES,
Defendant/Respondent,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the minor plaintiff to
recover damages for personal injuries allegedly arising out
of a motor vehicle-pedestrian accident on November 5, 1973
near the intersection of Mantle Avenue and 2200 West in
Salt Lake County, Utah at approximately 6:30 p.m.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried before an eight-member jury
who answered special interrogatories and found that the defendant was not negligent, which finding had two dissenting jurors,
and in addition found that the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent.

On plaintiff's contributorily negligence the

verdict was unanimous.

Based upon the jury's answers to
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interrogatories the Court entered its judgment on the verdict
in favor of defendant and against the plaintiff, No Cause of
Action.

Thereafter the Trial Court denied plaintiff's Motion

for New Trial.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks affirmance of the disposition
reached by the jury and the Court below.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Plaintiff's statement of the facts is essentially
correct only pertaining to the time and place of the accident.
The facts thereafter are in substantial dispute.

As opposed

to plaintiff's statement of facts, the facts as developed at
trial from defendant's viewpoint are as follows:
The defendant, a 22 year old married woman (Tr. 289)
who worked at the Valley Fair Mall, drove home from work alone,
never having anyone ride with her.

(Tr. 290). On the date of

the accident she got off work between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m.

It

was Mvery dark,f and since one could not see without headlights,
she had her lights on.

(Tr. 292). The mall is several blocks

north of the accident scene.

(Tr. 293). Defendant traveled

south at 25 miles per hour.

(Tr. 293). She went through the

intersection of Mantle Avenue and 2200 West without incident
(Tr. 294), looked at the speedometer (Tr. 293), a car from the
south passed going the other direction.

(Tr. 294). At about
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the same moment, and while she was in front of a house numbered 4246 on Exhibit D-l (Tr. 294), the plaintiff darted
out from the left of defendant's vehicle, into defendant's
path.

(Tr. 295). The plaintiff was running fast (Tr. 319)

and defendant could do nothing to avoid the collision.

(Tr. 295^

The plaintiff hit the front of defendant's car, then rolled off
the edge, not staying on the car. (Tr. 295). The impact happened just north of the mail box, which was approximately 90
feet south of the intersection.

(Tr. 296, Ex. D-l). The de-

fendant fell in about the same location as where the impact
occurred.

(Tr. 296, 306).
The plaintiff prior to the impact with the auto-

had been on the southeast corner of the intersection of Mantle
Avenue and 2200 West with six of her friends

f?

goofing around".

(Tr. 242). After the plaintiff washed a boy's face with snow
he chased the plaintiff, her cousin Julie, and friend Marilyn.
(Tr. 244, 323). Both Julie and Marilyn saw defendant's car and
stopped.

(Tr. 245, 324). Plaintiff, however, never did see

defendant's vehicle. (Tr. 195). There was no obstruction
preventing her from seeing a car approaching from the north.
(Tr. 196).
The damage on the front of defendant's car's hood
was "pretty minor". (Tr. 218). The police officer in his report stated that the pedestrian was not crossing within the
crosswalk and during his investigation he received no con-
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flicting report.

(Tr. 217),

Plaintiff's injuries were minor and did not
require hospitalization other than emergency room care.
178).
elbow.

(Tr. 170

She had abrasions on her forehead, (Tr. 180) and left
(Tr. 185). The bruises have healed well and she has

no discomfort except if she bumps her elbow or hip a certain
way.

(Tr. 199). The injuries have healed well with no com-

plications.

(Tr. 254, 255).
The plaintiff saw her treating physician on

November 8, 1973, three days after the accident, again on
November 21, 1973, on December 12, 1973 and on February 15,
1974.

This was the last time she saw Dr. Larsen until the

trial over a year later.

(Tr. 169, 170). In the interim,

the plaintiff was examined by Dr. Youngblood on March 8,
1974 (Tr. 254) and again just before the trial on March 10,
1975.

(Tr. 255).
The jury below answered a special verdict and

found that defendant was not negligent.
to this finding.

Two jurors dissented

The jury also found unanimously that the

plaintiff was negligent and that her negligence was the
cause of her own injuries.

The jury further showed their

intent by indicating that plaintiff should receive no amount
of money for her personal injury or for her medical expense
and lost clothing.

(R. 93-94).

The Court refused to grant a

new trial and this appeal then ensued.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE VERDICT BELOW IS SUSTAINED BY THE EVIDENCE.
Pursuant to Rule 59(a)(6) and (7), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, plaintiff seeks a new trial on the basis
of insufficient evidence to justify the verdict and error in
law.

The test as to sufficiency in such cases is whether

reasonable minds could be convinced by the facts in evidence
which are necessary to support the verdict.
Robinson, 112 Utah

Horsley v.

227, 186 P.2d 592, 597 (1947).

There must

be an absence of evidence against the prevailing party below
or a decided preponderance thereof in favor of Appellant before the verdict will be set aside.

People v. Swasey, 6 Utah 93,

21 Pac. 400 (1889); see also, Efco Distributing, Inc. v. Perrin,
17 U.2d 375, 412 P.2d 615, 617 (1966).

As can be readily

seen from the statement of facts above there was substantial
evidence upon which the jury could support its verdict and
from which reasonable minds could be convinced.
As can be seen from the conflicting statements
of fact presented by the brief's of Appellant and Respondent
herein, there were numerous and substantial conflicts in the
evidence produced at trial. As this Court has stated on
numerous occasions, conflicts in the evidence must be viewed
in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below.
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Potter v. Utah Driv-Ur-Self System, Inc., 11 U.2d 133, 355
P.2d 714 (1960).

See also: Larson v. Evans, 12 U.2d 24 5,

364 P.2d 1088 (1961).

On the subject of conflicts in the

evidence this Court has said:
But one question is presented
on this appeal: are the verdict
and judgment sustained by the evidence? No useful purpose would be
subserved by setting forth the testimony of the various witnesses. We
have read the record carefully. The
evidence is in conflict, but the jury
could well have come to the conclusion
it did. It is not for us to weigh
the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the jury and trial
court. In re GordonTs Estate, 101
Utah 523, 125 P.2d 413 (1942).
Considering the issues on appeal, the evidence is viewed
most favorably to the prevailing party below, and all reasonable presumptions are in favor of the validity of the verdict.
Morris v. Christensen,

11 U.2d 140, 356 P.2d 34 (1960);

Gibbons § Reed Co. v. Guthrie, 123 Utah 172, 256 P.2d 706 (1953).
Determination of the credibility of witnesses
should belong exclusively to the jury.

It is the jury that

has the exclusive prerogative of passing upon the credibility
of the evidence and of determining the facts.

Flynn v. W. P.

Harlin Construction Company, 29 U.2d 327, 509 P.2d 356 (1973).
In that case this court stated:
It has long been established in
our law that a court should not take
the case from a jury where there is
any substantial dispute in the evi-
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dence on issues of fact, but can properly do so only when the matter is
so plain that there really is no conflict in the evidence upon which reasonable minds could differ. (Citations
omitted). As was said for this Court
long ago by a greatly respected Justice •,:
Frick: ". . .unless the question is
free from doubt, the Court cannot pass
upon it as a matter of law. . . -. . . if . . . the Court is in doubt
whether reasonable men, . . . might
arrive at different conclusion, then
this very doubt determines the question
to be one of fact for the jury and not
one of law for the Court. (Citation
omitted).
The issue presented for consideration under
this point is whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain
a verdict for no liability.

Relative to this question the

evidence sustaining the verdice is that Mrs. Howes was driving
within the speed limit, on a very dark night and using her
headlights.

After going through an intersection and traver-

sing a crosswalk without incident a girl ran fast into the
path of defendant's vehicle just after a northbound vehicle
passed the defendant.

Mrs. Howes was given no warning of the

approach of the plaintiff and had no time to take evasive
action.

The plaintiff struck the front of the car and rolled

off the right side onto the ground and was found in the same
location where she was struck, approximately 90 feet from the
crosswalk.

Both the damage to the front of the defendant's

vehicle and the injuries to the plaintiff are consistent with
a low speed inpact and with the plaintiff being struck close
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to where she fell.

It is totally unreasonable that such

minor damage to the car and minor injury to the plaintiff
would have occurred if the defendant's speed would have been
greater and if the plaintiff would have been hit while in or
near to the crosswalk and would have been thrown 90 feet as
claimed by plaintiff.
Plaintiff relies heavily on measurements and
calculations that plaintiff's attorney makes in his brief.
On cross-examination by plaintiff's attorney the defendant
stated that she looked at her speedometer just before the
northbound car passed her. (Tr. 301). Plaintiff's counsel
then had the defendant indicate on Exhibit D-l where this
would have been.
say."

In doing so she said "about here I would

(Tr. 301). With this information which is obviously

and of necessity

meant to be approximate, plaintiff has

attempted precise measurements and calculations and suggests
it was impossible for the defendant to look at her speedometer,
observe a car northbound, and see the plaintiff dart in front
of her vehicle.

His measurement indicates that this would

have had to take place within 15 feet while traveling 25 miles
per hour.

Such an approach is a ploy used by counsel to obtain

an approximation from a witness and then to use that approximation in making exact calculations.

This is the kind of ex-

ercise which received Justice Henroid's disapproval when he
said in his opinion that such a procedure "... lays undue
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emphasis on split-second calculations indulged in hypothetical
questions based on conjecture."

Holmes v. Nelson, 7 U.2d 435,

326 P.2d 722, 727 (1958).
Plaintiff's brief claims that defendant was negligent in failing to yield the right-of-way because it is
"undisputed in the evidence that plaintiff was in the crosswalk until she reached the center of the street."

Plaintiff

by her own argument admits that she was not in the crosswalk
at the time of the accident.

In fact it is disputed that she

was in the crosswalk at all since defendant's testimony puts
her some 90 feet from the crosswalk when she was struck.

This

is the evidence that is supported by the jury verdict and the
verity of such verdict must therefore be presumed.
On pages 21 and 22 of Plaintiff's brief the
Plaintiff attempts to state the evidence most favorable to the
defendant.

She states that having ample opportunity to do

so defendant failed to see the plaintiff until she hit her.
To the contrary, the evidence shows that defendant had no
opportunity to see the plaintiff due to the dark night, the
on-coming vehicle, and plaintiff running directly into her
path.

Plaintiff also contends the "undisputed evidence" places

plaintiff in the crosswalk until she reached the middle of
the street and that she was then struck within 15 feet of the
crosswalk.

This also is not true since the defendant herself

testified that the Plaintiff was far from the crosswalk when
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seen and struck.

This is the testimony the jury obviously

believed and which must be viewed favorably by this Court,
Plaintiff's counsel then suggests that we speculate with him
when he states that "...any split-second delay in defendant's
arrival at the point of impact would have prevented the
collision, ...".

There is no such evidence anywhere in the

record nor is any referred to by counsel.
The plain facts were that a girl on a dark night
ran into the path of a car that she should have seen and stopped
for just as her two girlfriends did and thereby avoid the
collision that plaintiff suffered.

For this the jury found

the plaintiff was negligent and that such negligence caused
her accident.
The plaintiff received the jury trial she requested.

(R. 105). Whatever party requests trial by jury,

that right is guarded jealously by this Court.
This case having been tried to a
jury, they were the exclusive judges
of the evidence and of the inferences
to be drawn therefrom. It was not the
privilege of the Court to disagree with
and overrule their action unless the
evidence so unerringly pointed to a
contrary conclusion that there existed
no reasonable basis for the jury's
finding. This Court has many times
affirmed committment to a policy of
reluctance to interfere with Findings
of Fact and verdicts rendered by
juries and has declared that it should
be done only when the matter is so clear
as to be free from doubt. (Citations
omitted). In Butz v. Union Pac. R.R.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(citation omitted) we quoted with approval
the language of Justice Murphy, speaking
for the United States Supreme Court with
respect to trial by jury: "* * * a right
so fundamental and sacred to the citizen,
whether guaranteed by the Constitution
or provided by Statute, should be jealously
guarded by the Courts.ff Again in Stickle v.
Union Pac. R. R. Co., (citation omitted)
we stated "* * * we remain cognizant of the
vital importance of the privilege of the
trial by jury in our system of justice and
deem it our duty to zealously protect and
preserve it." Cottrell v. Grand Union Tea
Company, 5 U.2d 187, 299 P.2d 622, 626 (1966).
From the rendition of the facts and argument
thereon by the plaintiff in her brief it seems to merit the
language of this Court in Douglas v. Duval1, 5 U.2d 429, 304
P. 2d 373 (1956) where it is said:
Plaintiffs' brief recites the facts
most favorable to themselves, losers below, which facts were sharply controverted,
an approach this Court does not accept.
(Citations omitted).

POINT II
THERE IS NO ERROR IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 8.
Plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 8 would
have instructed the jury that the location of the accident
was in a residential area.

This fact should have hardly

needed instruction since most of plaintiff's witnesses stated
that they lived in this vicinity.

The Instruction went on

to state that one has a duty in a residential area to exercise
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reasonable care to observe the presence of children or other
persons who may reasonably be expected to be on or near the
street upon which defendant's vehicle was being operated.
Plaintiff gives no supporting authority for this
Instruction, but as a compelling reason for giving it the
plaintiff states that the accident in fact happened in a
residential area.
The Instruction was in fact covered by several
others that were in fact given.

Instruction No. 11 gives

the usual definition of negligence requiring one to be reasonable and prudent under the circumstances.

(R. 72). Instruction

No. 18 explains the requirement of maintaining a proper lookout, to pay attention and to see what is in plain sight.

(R.79).

Instruction No. 20 explains the duty to yield the right-of-way
to a pedestrian in a crosswalk.

(R. 81). Instruction No. 22

states that defendant is to operate her vehicle reasonably
under the circumstances with regard for the surface and width
of the road, the traffic and the actual or potential hazards.
Emphasis added. (R. 83)

Instruction No. 23 places the duty

on a defendant to avoid danger, to be aware and to observe
the highway conditions, the presence of pedestrians,
maintain a lookout for persons in the vicinity.
added.

and to

Emphasis

(R. 84).
These combined instructions cotfer all the points

contained in plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 8 as well
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as other points not covered.

If any error be found in failing

to give Instruction No. 8 such error, in view of the other
instructions actually given, cannot reasonably be said to
be of consequence or prejudicial.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL.
The defendant incorporates herein the arguments
already set forth in Point I.

It is well established that

the granting or refusing of a Motion for a New Trial based
on insufficiency of evidence is largely within the discretion
of the trial court. Moser v. Z.C.M.I., 114 Utah 58, 197 P.2d
136 (1948); Reynolds v. W. W. Clyde § Co., 5 U.2d 151, 298
P.2d 530 (1956).

In the case of Gordon v. Provo City, 15 U.2d

287, 291 P.2d 430 (1964), this Court said:
The purpose of a trial is to
afford the parties a full and fair
opportunity to present their evidence
and contentions and to have the issues
in dispute between them determined by
a jury. When this objective has been
accomplished, and when the trial court
has given its approval thereto by refusing to grant a new trial, the judgment should be looked upon with some
degree of verity. The presumption is
in favor of its validity and the burden
is upon the appellant to show some
pursuasive reason for upsetting it.
(Citations). Under the cardinal and
oft-repeated rule of review, we will
not disturb the jury's finding so
long as it is supported by substantial
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V

:

evidence, that is, evidence which,
together with the fair inferences
that may be drawn therefrom, reasonable minds could conclude as the jury
did; (Citations). And we will not
reverse the judgment entered thereon
unless in arriving at it substantial
and prejudicial error was committed
in the sense that in its absence there
is a reasonable likelihood that there
would have been a different result.
In the case of Wellman v. Noble, 12 U.2d 350,

366 P.2d 701 (1961), cited also by plaintiff, the trial
court granted a new trial and the Supreme Court affirmed
the Court's discretion.

The case is cited here as support

for the notion that the trial Judge's ruling on the Motion
for a New Trial should be affirmed.

The Court reasoned as

follows:
. . . since the trial Judge has seen
and heard the witnesses and had a firsthand view of all of the evidence, and the
proceedings throughout the trial and has
ruled on the admissibility of the evidence,
and instructed the jury on the law governing
their verdict, and had opportunity of observing the tactics of counsel throughout the
trial and the jury's reaction thereto, his
ruling on a Motion for a New Trial should
not be overruled unless it clearly appears
that he abused his discretion.
CONCLUSION
The lower Court had an opportunity to grant
a new trial if it believed all the circumstances warranted
such action, but it has declined to do so.

Since the verdict

was supported by substantial evidence, together with the fact
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that the jury was unanimous in finding the plaintiff negligent, there has been no abuse of discretion and the Court's
ruling on the new trial should be sustained.

The evidence

being considered as a whole points to numerous conflicts.
These conflicts must be viewed in a light most favorable
to the defendant, having prevailed below.

Although conflicting,

substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict in this case.
Such evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to
the defendant.

Where reasonable minds could have found as

the jury did from the evidence before it, the trial court
does not abuse its discretion in denying a Motion for a New
Trial on the ground of insufficient evidence.

The trial

Court was not only aware of all of the evidence, but it was
able to evaluate it in light of other observations made
pending the trial.

Based on the sufficiency of evidence and

the Court's observations there was no abuse of discretion in
refusing to grant a new trial.
Based on the foregoing, defendant respectfully
submits the action of the Court and Jury below should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT W. MILLER
BRANDT, MILLER, NELSON § CHRISTOPHERSON
716 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent
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